Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency: Dhofar, Operation Iraqi Freedom Case Study, Oman, Sultan Qaboos, General Franks, Rumsfeld, Petraeus

Nonfiction, History, Military
Cover of the book Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency: Dhofar, Operation Iraqi Freedom Case Study, Oman, Sultan Qaboos, General Franks, Rumsfeld, Petraeus by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781310559389
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: April 8, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781310559389
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: April 8, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for the support of the population against an active and thinking enemy and therefore, there are no hard and fast rules. Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists do, however, agree on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents in prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add to the body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that counterinsurgents should take into account when considering raising an irregular security force.

Mankind has waged insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout history. Despite the large volume of material available for the study of these forms of conflict, there yet remains a great deal of myth and confusion surrounding insurgency and counterinsurgency. Modern western militaries largely neglected the study of counterinsurgency prior to the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Stung by the loss in Vietnam, the US military chose to minimize counterinsurgency and focused on the conventional warfare which it preferred and was better trained, organized, and equipped to conduct.

This choice was not merely academic, but impacted the way the Army trained, procured equipment, educated its leaders, and prepared for war. As Jonathan M. House wrote in Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, "To meet the challenge of the wars of national liberation, Western armies had two choices - they could attempt to adapt their conventional forces to a style of war for which they were not intended, or they could neglect the development of new generations of armored weapons in favor of a renewed interest in light infantry forces." Should the United States expend the bulk of its resources to prepare its forces to win proxy wars of insurgency and counterinsurgency, or should it remain prepared to win the less likely but more serious conventional conflict with the Soviet Union? After Vietnam the choice was clear, and counterinsurgency was mostly discarded by the conventional force as a task for Special Forces.

As the United States focused more on the possible conventional fight between the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact, American strategy and doctrine envisaged a battle against numerically superior enemy forces which required a defensive posture reliant more on firepower than maneuver. In order to increase the odds of survival against a numerically superior enemy, American military leaders pressed for weapons systems with greater precision in an attempt to improve the Army's odds on the battlefield.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for the support of the population against an active and thinking enemy and therefore, there are no hard and fast rules. Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists do, however, agree on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents in prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add to the body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that counterinsurgents should take into account when considering raising an irregular security force.

Mankind has waged insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout history. Despite the large volume of material available for the study of these forms of conflict, there yet remains a great deal of myth and confusion surrounding insurgency and counterinsurgency. Modern western militaries largely neglected the study of counterinsurgency prior to the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Stung by the loss in Vietnam, the US military chose to minimize counterinsurgency and focused on the conventional warfare which it preferred and was better trained, organized, and equipped to conduct.

This choice was not merely academic, but impacted the way the Army trained, procured equipment, educated its leaders, and prepared for war. As Jonathan M. House wrote in Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, "To meet the challenge of the wars of national liberation, Western armies had two choices - they could attempt to adapt their conventional forces to a style of war for which they were not intended, or they could neglect the development of new generations of armored weapons in favor of a renewed interest in light infantry forces." Should the United States expend the bulk of its resources to prepare its forces to win proxy wars of insurgency and counterinsurgency, or should it remain prepared to win the less likely but more serious conventional conflict with the Soviet Union? After Vietnam the choice was clear, and counterinsurgency was mostly discarded by the conventional force as a task for Special Forces.

As the United States focused more on the possible conventional fight between the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact, American strategy and doctrine envisaged a battle against numerically superior enemy forces which required a defensive posture reliant more on firepower than maneuver. In order to increase the odds of survival against a numerically superior enemy, American military leaders pressed for weapons systems with greater precision in an attempt to improve the Army's odds on the battlefield.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book The Proximity Principle: Army Chaplains on the Fighting Line in Doctrine and History – Historical Survey of Important Chaplains in Ground Combat Since 1926, World War II and Korean War, Emil Kapuan by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2013 Obamacare Guide - The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA) - Understanding Health Care Insurance Options, New Plans, Programs, Bill of Rights, Full Text of Law by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Essential Guide to Catalan, Catalonia, and the Claim of Independence from Spain: Reports on Autonomy, Language, Culture, Economy, Regional Issues, Comprehensive Spanish History, and Barcelona by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Defense Is From Mars, State Is From Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security - Covering Peacekeeping, Foreign Policy, and the Character Traits of Military Officers and Diplomats by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Papers - Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): A Policy Planning Handbook - Stopping Genocide by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Defense Science Board Report: Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies (January 2014) - Difficulty of Detecting Secret Nuclear Weapons Activity by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Nanoscience and Nanotechnology: Environmental, Health, and Safety Research Strategy, Human and Environmental Exposure Assessment, Innovative Medical Research at the Molecular Scale by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Drug Cartels and Gangs in Mexico and Central America: A View Through the Lens of Counterinsurgency - Mexican Cartels, COIN Doctrine, Colombia's Insurgency, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Organized Crime Growth and Sustainment: A Review of the Influence of Popular Religion and Beliefs in Mexico - Drug Gangs, El Chapo, Narco-Cultura, Narco-Corridos, Sinaloa Cartel, Malverde Cult, Saints by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Israel's Ascendance to a Technologically Advanced Regional Economic Power: Review of History of High-Quality Immigrants, Government Reforms and Subsidies, Tech Innovation Without Natural Resources by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Eighth Army in Korea: The Value of Intangible Leadership - General Matthew Ridgway; Human Dimension of War, The Character to Lead and the Courage to Lead an Follow, Competence in Action by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Pistol Marksmanship Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-01B by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Continuities in Four Disparate Air Battles: Ploesti Heavy Bombers in World War II, Berlin Airlift Strategic Airpower, MIG Alley in Korean War, Barrel Roll Airpower Counter-insurgency in Laos by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Turkey: Kurdish Regional Government Relations After the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map? PKK, PUK, Syrian Civil War and Refugees, Massoud Barzani, Erdogan, Kurdistan by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Civilization's Drying Cradle: Water Politics in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin - Water Supplies and Conflicts, Desalination, Dams, Hydroelectric Plants, Drought Impacting Turkey, Syria, Iraq by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy